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Rusijos karas prieš Ukrainą ir bandymai grasinti NATO
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Parašė Obi-Wan Kenobi Rodyti pranešimąVakarai neturi kiaušų kovoti dėl Rytų Europos.O ir nelabai jiems jos reikia, jei tik jų pačių nelies.
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Parašė Maalinauskas Rodyti pranešimą
Skirtumas tame kad NATO su hučiais nekariauja pilnu pajėgimu, skirtingai nei rusija Ukrainoje.
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Parašė Lettered Rodyti pranešimą
O su Rusija kariautų pilnu pajėgumu? Manau yra kažkokie susitarimai, kitaip toks karas išsivystytų į WWIII ir dar branduolinį.
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Parašė Lettered Rodyti pranešimą
Netiesiogiai labai stipriai paliestų, kristų ekonomika, būtų prarastos rinkos ir t. t. Pigiau pasirūpinti ES rytinės sienos apsauga nei vėliau kovoti su karo padariniais.
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Parašė gerietis Rodyti pranešimąEilinis pavyzdys kad Lietuva be tankų - Lietuva be ateities.
https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarV...ed_attack_was/
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Laukia naujas infokaro išpuolis prieš UA. Vakar į Maskvą atvyko Tucker Carlson, kuris, šnekama, ims interviu su xujlo. Jau x/twitterio vata (ir kacapų mikštosios galios įrankis) kaip Lexas Fridmanas ruošia dirva tam, o Muskas pasiruošęs maksimaliai viską išplatinti fone, to, kad Trumpistai vakar visiškai sužlugdė paramą UA:
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Parašė udrius Rodyti pranešimąŠiaip tai man dabar labai nepatinka Ukrainos priešlėktuvinės aviacijos rezultatai - jei ankščiau numušdavo beveik 100 proc dronų, tai dabar numušimo procentas tėra grubiai 50 proc. Ką tai gali reikšti? Taupo šaudmenis? Nunaikintos priešlėktuvinės sistemos?
Gerai, kad dronus turi ne tik rusai. Vatnikų blogeriai skundžiasi, kad rusų vadai tą pamiršo ir pasiuntė koloną sunkios technikos į ataką, prarasta 10 sunkios technikos vienetų.
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Parašė Eidvis Rodyti pranešimą
Reikia nepamiršti, kad tie rusų dronai tobulėja. Pvz. šiandien pasirodė žinios, kad kai yra numušamas vienas šahedas, už jo skrendantis šahedas automatiškai keičia kursą ir apskrenda tą zoną, o jei ir jis numušamas - tai už jo skrendantys dronai koreguoja savo kursą taip iš esmės bandymų būdu yra atrandamas kelias, kurio nedengia oro gynybos sistemos.
Gerai, kad dronus turi ne tik rusai. Vatnikų blogeriai skundžiasi, kad rusų vadai tą pamiršo ir pasiuntė koloną sunkios technikos į ataką, prarasta 10 sunkios technikos vienetų.
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Beje vakar gana įdomus darbas išėjo viešumon apie rusų artilerijos likučius. Jei trumpai, tai dar ~ pora metų karo rusiją paliktų be artilerijos.
O čia kiek patogiau sudėlioti skaičiukai iš video:
Richard Vereker
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Visiškai neaišku, ar toks linijinis skaičiavimas taikytinas. Pirmais metais, ko gero, praradimai buvo ženklesni. Kita vertus, dalis pabūklų, nors dar fronte, bet jau ant susidėvėjimo ribos ar net ją viršyja. Nelabai aišku ir kokios vamzdžių atsargos.
Gamyba, įtariu, menka. Iki karo veikė vos 2 gamyklos, kuriose dalis staklių dar iš 1930-ųjų.
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Parašė Sula Rodyti pranešimąVisiškai neaišku, ar toks linijinis skaičiavimas taikytinas. Pirmais metais, ko gero, praradimai buvo ženklesni. Kita vertus, dalis pabūklų, nors dar fronte, bet jau ant susidėvėjimo ribos ar net ją viršyja. Nelabai aišku ir kokios vamzdžių atsargos.
Gamyba, įtariu, menka. Iki karo veikė vos 2 gamyklos, kuriose dalis staklių dar iš 1930-ųjų.
Dėl haubicų gamybos, tai po tais postais buvo komentarų, kad rusai gamina po ~20 SPH per mėnesį, bet vėl čia neaišku, ar nėra kaip su tankais, kai į "gamybą" nurašoma tiesiog atnaujinti seni laužai.
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Parašė Sula Rodyti pranešimąVisiškai neaišku, ar toks linijinis skaičiavimas taikytinas. Pirmais metais, ko gero, praradimai buvo ženklesni. Kita vertus, dalis pabūklų, nors dar fronte, bet jau ant susidėvėjimo ribos ar net ją viršyja. Nelabai aišku ir kokios vamzdžių atsargos.
Gamyba, įtariu, menka. Iki karo veikė vos 2 gamyklos, kuriose dalis staklių dar iš 1930-ųjų.
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Lenkų karo eksperto nuomonė apie dronus Ukrainoje. Autovertimas su savo minusais apačioje, Pas A.Bačiulį fb yra lietuviškai. Jei reikėtų šitą tekstą apibūdinti vienu sakiniu, tai dronai(koviniai) yra puikus sprendimas varganai kariuomenei.
Jarosław Wolski
Is this the beginning of a new era in the military? Is the time of drones combating armored and mechanized columns coming and the era of tanks is ending? Of course not. You will read why below.
I have written and said many times that the first conclusion to be drawn from the war in Ukraine should be not to draw too far-reaching conclusions from the war in Ukraine. For a year now, those following the conflict have been inundated with images of the use of dorns by both sides of the conflict. The issue is the impression that drones are ubiquitous, inevitable, that a new era in the military field has arrived. Both sides of the conflict boast about them and emphasize their use, and videos of their use against armored vehicles are especially eager to be published. Meanwhile, it's all a bit like an unemployed person boasting about how much free time he has, or someone without a car boasting that he rides a bike to the next city regardless of the weather conditions and the season. Both sides use drones en masse because they have to, because they have no other weapons or are systemically inefficient. On the basis of both Russian and Ukrainian weaknesses - skillfully patched up with dornas - attempts are made to draw far-fetched conclusions regarding the evolution of the battlefield. The facts are as follows: - about 40% of drone use involves finishing off damaged vehicles. Both sides are trying to make it economically irrational to evacuate and repair damaged machines. This has significant repercussions because in previous conflicts, 3/4 of damaged but not burned/blown up vehicles were restored to service and returned to the line. - the fire effectiveness of FPV drones and those dropping VS submunitions is slightly higher than the typical effectiveness of anti-tank hand weapons. On average, it takes 4 to 6 hits to hit a vehicle to eliminate it from combat or destroy it. Of course, there are videos showing lucky hits on the principle - drone strike - vehicle explosion, but the statistics where you can see a number of attacks show that even precisely guided FPV drones usually need 4-6 hits. The effectiveness of small anti-tank weapons in Chechnya and Donbas in 2014-2015 was approximately 5-8 hits. So, guided weapons are of course more effective, but... there is no gap. - there is a classic error resulting from the available material - basically every drone attack is recorded and usually posted on the Internet for propaganda purposes. ATGM operators and artillerymen only have such a luxury in sporadic cases. This leads to a situation where one type of means of destruction dominates in the audiovisual material, which distorts the statistics of use and effectiveness. As a result, despite the abundance of material, only in a few cases it was possible to trace the RUS or UA columns from detection and artillery bombardment to the minefields and trenches of the attacked side in order to trace the number and type of means of destruction. 47BZ attack, attack on the heap and tracks north of Avdijewka, but somewhat selectively Wuhledar, Syniwka, and... not much more, basically two well-documented cases of RUS assaults. The selective material from which drones dominate leads to selective conclusions. - about 3/4 of drone use - and especially FPV takes place from 1 to 5 km from FEBA. They are used as the system equivalent of the Spike LR2 MMP/Arkeon ATGMs, etc. Generally, as a cheaper but much worse functional equivalent of the NLOS/BLOS ATGMs. For one Spike you can buy about 20-30 FPV drones, but remember that ATGMs over optical fiber are practically resistant to interference - at most you can try to burn/blind the optics with a laser. Moreover, most weather conditions and time of day/night are not an obstacle. Drones - it's very different here. The ATGM also has a sensible warhead with a penetration capacity of over 1100 mm of steel with the precursor, and the drone usually has a PG-7V/VS HEAT grenade attached at its top. In the case of FPV drones, you need (apart from luck) to have 4 to 6 hits to eliminate/destroy the vehicle. If Spike hits it, the competition is over for the vehicle. Even the Javelin with its infamous engine drift has over an 85% chance of destroying anything it hits. As a result, the cost ratio for 20-30 drones vs. 1 Spike-LR2 is completely non-obvious - especially when we add the drone's flight time at 5-7 km and the number of operators and the number of hits statistically necessary to destroy the vehicle. - Drones are used by both sides as a system versatz of air CAS, NLOS ATGMs, heavy ATGMs, and artillery with anti-tank assets. Drones are cheap, mass-produced, in certain conditions they often hit, but statistically they need many hits to eliminate the target and, unfortunately, they are susceptible to flight conditions/time of day and the presence of jamming. In civilized NATO armies fighting in depth, what the AU/RUS are trying to do with hundreds of drones would be done by ONE F-16 with a CBU-97 pod, a 4 M 109 battery with SADARM firing 16 SADARm missiles, or 2-4 Ah-64E firing 16-32 Hellfires II/JAGM. Or drink our Otokary-Brzoza from Brimstone II. What would crawl 1-5 km from FEBA would have to be met with... something that the UA still almost does not have on a battalion scale: for a mech company, e.g. 24 flying EuroSpike/MELS or Spiek ATGMs, in the worst case - the same number TOW- 2B . (Ukrainians currently have 1-3 Stugnas per battalion PER MONTH. Plus occasional Javelins.) v I would like to point out that for slightly different reasons, the RUSs do not look much better. This is due to the wear and tear of attack helicopters, the lack of artillery, and this is due to the traditional performance of air forces. Where is the horse and where is the master? Let's not turn poverty (compared to NATO) into a virtue and a role model. The Ukrainians are desperate for what they have (drones) because they have too few anti-tank/stand-off/NLOS assets, while at the same time the army is growing enormously and the losses are noticeable. - the remaining 25% (approximately) of drone use may be a reason to consider their role on the battlefield. That is, attacks at greater depth, retranslation, etc. But we have it - e.g. GLADIUS from WB. This is nothing new and the problems have been known for years and are constant: communication and WRE. - completely unverifiable statements from Russia state that the rate of personnel and equipment losses resulting from the use of Ukrainian drones reaches 30-40%, depending on the area of operation. Of course, this is a great result and it corresponds to the predicted minimum losses that the NATO "meat grinder" was to inflict on the armored and mechanized columns of the UW countries as I described above: CAS/artillery/AH-64/Miny/ATGM nlos. This means that under very specific conditions, UA managed to find a temporary replacement. Is it cheaper? Yes. Is it better? Not necessarily. So, do drones used as in Ukraine/Russia pose a big problem for NATO countries? Yes and no. Certainly not in terms of capabilities, because where 30 FPV Dorns are used out of necessity, civilized NATO armies have one Otokar-Brzoza with Brimstone II or 4 M109/Krabs with SADARM/BONUS, etc. Or Ah-64E with a dozen JAGMs. The effect is the same, but more reliable/faster/more deadly. However, drones are a noticeable and big problem because, firstly, the UA has shown that in the absence of WRE, it is possible to temporarily compensate for the lack of expensive SpW worth billions of USD with drones amounting to 10,000 attacks per month, including FPV for USD 5,000 each - and it has gone wrong in the system. And secondly, the Russians have noticed that they can compensate systemically for what they have always lacked in the clash with NATO, just as the Ukrainians compensated for them - with micro and mini drones. And this is a very ominous memento for us (cc
@wieslawkukula
). Of course, this drone menagerie would evolve completely differently if USA Growlers were flying, if modern jamming stations and, more broadly, WRE, were operating, if air superiority allowed for many things. We should rather expect effectiveness as in Zaporizhia in the summer of 2023 than in other places. But the constant question is "what if" and this is what keeps many countries awake at night and have started programs to develop systemic countermeasures to micro/mini drones. A separate issue is to what extent drones expand situational awareness at the platoon-digging level. Here we have an actual revolution, the description of which should be in a separate entry. In any case: drones in Ukraine are not a revolution in terms of combating armored and mechanized columns. They are a cheaper but in every respect worse substitute for the means that have been in use in NATO's leading armies since the 1980s. However, in very specific conditions (static front, micro-clashes to max company, "transparency" of one's own group towards NPL observation means), drones can systemically compensate to a large extent the shortcomings of both Ukrainians and Russians compared to the leading NATO countries, with the USA at the forefront. The only problem is that this is not a permanent state of affairs, but an exploitation of the enemy's temporary weakness in a given area, as shown by the failed summer offensive in 2023 (effectiveness of WRE) and how selectively effective the use of FPV drones is currently. So will drones become the weapon of the poor? Maybe. Without a doubt, they cannot be underestimated, and in the absence of preparation of own forces (mainly WRE), the effects of their use will be equivalent to falling under the CAS and NLOS ATGMs - which should be a sufficient reason to take this threat seriously and purchase countermeasures.Paskutinis taisė Galys; 2024.02.05, 05:59.
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Senate releases $118 billion bipartisan aid proposal for Israel, Ukraine, border security https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/04/sena...e-border
Senators on Sunday released the details of a $118.2 billion bipartisan aid proposal for Ukraine, Israel and the southern U.S. border, after months of painstaking, closed-door negotiations.
The long-awaited bill requests $60.1 billion for Ukraine aid, $14.1 billion for Israel and $20.2 billion to improve security at the U.S. border. It also includes smaller pockets of funding for humanitarian assistance in war-torn regions, and defense operations in the Red Sea and Taiwan.
President Joe Biden initially proposed a more than $105 billion aid package in October. The Senate’s new deal roughly matches the funding proportions Biden had requested for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan. The central difference in the new proposal is over $13 billion more in border security funding, which was a major point of contention in the months-long Senate talks.Nepirk iš Decathlon, Ritter Sport, Philips, Nestle, KraftHeinz, Viada, Vičiūnų, ypač Kalnapilis myžalų,
Toblerone, Milka, Dirol, Halls (Mondelez International), Hellmann's, Heineken, Mars, PepsiCo
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Parašė Arunasx Rodyti pranešimąSenate releases $118 billion bipartisan aid proposal for Israel, Ukraine, border security https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/04/sena...e-border
p.s. užpirkime mišias
https://www.axios.com/2024/01/26/mik...te-border-deal
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