Bačiulio FB, kadangi cituoja įdomų Edward Lucas straipsnį, dedu visą:
Kaip sakoma, kuomet faktų nebeįmanoma ignoruoti
Metai nepraėjo nuo Donaldo Trumpo inauguracijos, o dar vienas patologinis anti-trumperis pro sukąstus dantis priverstas pripažinti, jog Trumpas, žinoma, nemokša, neišmanėlis, chamas ir visoks kitoks nevykėlis, bet štai kažkaip jam pavyko į visus postus, atsakingus už Vakarų pasaulio ir Europos saugumą, paskirti puikius specialistus, skirti daugiau pinigų Rytų Europos gynybai nuo Rusijos ir priversti Vakarų Europą pagaliau imti didinti jos pačios išlaidas gynybai.
Kai Audrius Bačiulis rašė ir kalbėjo, kad Donaldo Trumpo pergalė - tai geriausia, kas galėjo nutikti Lietuvai 2016 metais, mūsuose nežinia kodėl didžiai įžvalgiu analitiku tebelaikomas Edis Lucas vieną po kito tebekurpė paskvilius apie siaubingas grėsmes, kurias atneš Vakarams proamerikietiško politiko išrinkimas Amerikos prezidentu.
Net dabar jis bamba, esą blogai, kad Trumpas dar nepasirašė naujausių Kongrese priimtų sankcijų Rusijai papildymų ir dar nepradėjo tiekti ginklų Ukrainai, nors kartu pripažįsta, kad prie Trumpo europiečiai gali miegoti žymiai ramiau, nei prie Putino draugo Obamos.
Bet atkreipkit dėmesį - apie "Trumpo bendradarbiavimą su Rusija" Lucas jau net nepypteli, o juk kiek prirašęs buvo
Bet kai pusantrų metų nei FBI, nei specialaus prokuroro tyrimai neranda nieko, išskyrus Obamos administracijos, Clintonų šeimos korupcinius ryšius su Rusija ir FBI vadovybės pastangas juos pridengti, galimai netgi sudarant sąmokslą įrodymų klastojimui, tai kas belieka?
Vašingtone šią savaitę suvis žadama imtis FBI vadovybės valymo, nes kongresmenams ir senatoriams akys virsta, per jėgą išsireikalautus dokumentus beskaitant. Žinoma, CNN ar Washington Post apie tai tyli.
Kadangi The Times nėra laisvoje prieigoje, dedu ilgas citatas:
"Startlingly for those who believe that Mr Trump is a Russian puppet, his administration is actually rather popular in the countries that live in the Kremlin’s shadow. Barack Obama’s administration is remembered there as aloof, preachy and inconsistent.
For the authorities in places such as Budapest and Warsaw, Mr Trump’s election was excellent news. Hostility towards migrants, economic protectionism and a disrespectful approach to political convention are no longer taboo. Headstrong politicians such as Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s prime minister, or Jarosław Kaczynski, the ruling party’s chief in Poland, can now argue that they are merely taking the same line as the leader of the free world.
Mr Trump’s rapturously received speech in Warsaw this year vehemently defended national sovereignty and freedom but barely mentioned democracy. Responding to what conservative Poles see as the European Union’s bossy secularism, he decried the (unnamed) forces that sought to “erase the bonds of culture, faith and tradition”.
Even those who dislike Mr Trump’s politics are happy with his administration’s help in defending them against the Kremlin. America is selling Patriot missiles to Poland and has deployed a deterrent force there. US special forces are in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, working with local reservists and others to prepare resistance in the event of a Russian invasion. American military ties with non-Nato Sweden and Finland have never been stronger.
In Washington, Congress showers money on European defence, not just in bolstering the military deterrent but also for counter-propaganda and other softer forms of security.
The shambles of the past is no guide to the present. Wess Mitchell, the State Department official in charge of Europe, is a hawkish heavyweight who has devoted his career to the security of central and eastern Europe. Fiona Hill, the Russia director at the National Security Council, is a widely respected expert and co-author of a sizzlingly critical biography of Mr Putin. (Disclosure: both are friends of mine.)
At a more senior level, Mike Pence, the vice president, is pitch-perfect in his commitment to containing Russia and defending allies. So is Jim Mattis, the defence secretary, and HR McMaster, the national security adviser.
That contrasts sharply with the Obama-era White House, where America’s European allies frequently struggled to get a hearing and senior officials all too often pooh-poohed their concerns.
Mr Obama’s disastrous “reset” of relations with Russia in 2009 sacrificed allies’ interests in the illusory hope of a rapprochement with the Kremlin. His administration abruptly cancelled a hard-fought missile-defence base in Poland, and did so on September 17, the anniversary of the Soviet invasion in 1939.
As that woeful timing suggests, the State Department was in a mess then too. John Kerry, the former secretary of state, preferred personal diplomatic crusades to reforming the dysfunctional bureaucracy he bequeathed to Rex Tillerson.
The Obama administration also fiercely resisted congressional efforts to impose sanctions on Russia.
Mr Trump’s crude threats to withdraw security guarantees from countries that do not spend 2 per cent of GDP on defence breached the rhetorical rules. However they spurred more spending. European countries have finally started defence planning and coordination — albeit pragmatically; grandiose dreams of a European army remain just that.
The biggest result of the increased focus on defence is the bleak realisation that dangers are growing and that European countries, regardless of whether they are in or out of the EU and Nato, have no chance of defending themselves without American help.
We may find Mr Trump aesthetically and morally reprehensible. But in many respects that directly concern us and our allies, his administration is still markedly better than its predecessor.
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/t...bama-bcr82cr8p
Metai nepraėjo nuo Donaldo Trumpo inauguracijos, o dar vienas patologinis anti-trumperis pro sukąstus dantis priverstas pripažinti, jog Trumpas, žinoma, nemokša, neišmanėlis, chamas ir visoks kitoks nevykėlis, bet štai kažkaip jam pavyko į visus postus, atsakingus už Vakarų pasaulio ir Europos saugumą, paskirti puikius specialistus, skirti daugiau pinigų Rytų Europos gynybai nuo Rusijos ir priversti Vakarų Europą pagaliau imti didinti jos pačios išlaidas gynybai.
Kai Audrius Bačiulis rašė ir kalbėjo, kad Donaldo Trumpo pergalė - tai geriausia, kas galėjo nutikti Lietuvai 2016 metais, mūsuose nežinia kodėl didžiai įžvalgiu analitiku tebelaikomas Edis Lucas vieną po kito tebekurpė paskvilius apie siaubingas grėsmes, kurias atneš Vakarams proamerikietiško politiko išrinkimas Amerikos prezidentu.
Net dabar jis bamba, esą blogai, kad Trumpas dar nepasirašė naujausių Kongrese priimtų sankcijų Rusijai papildymų ir dar nepradėjo tiekti ginklų Ukrainai, nors kartu pripažįsta, kad prie Trumpo europiečiai gali miegoti žymiai ramiau, nei prie Putino draugo Obamos.
Bet atkreipkit dėmesį - apie "Trumpo bendradarbiavimą su Rusija" Lucas jau net nepypteli, o juk kiek prirašęs buvo
Bet kai pusantrų metų nei FBI, nei specialaus prokuroro tyrimai neranda nieko, išskyrus Obamos administracijos, Clintonų šeimos korupcinius ryšius su Rusija ir FBI vadovybės pastangas juos pridengti, galimai netgi sudarant sąmokslą įrodymų klastojimui, tai kas belieka?
Vašingtone šią savaitę suvis žadama imtis FBI vadovybės valymo, nes kongresmenams ir senatoriams akys virsta, per jėgą išsireikalautus dokumentus beskaitant. Žinoma, CNN ar Washington Post apie tai tyli.
Kadangi The Times nėra laisvoje prieigoje, dedu ilgas citatas:
"Startlingly for those who believe that Mr Trump is a Russian puppet, his administration is actually rather popular in the countries that live in the Kremlin’s shadow. Barack Obama’s administration is remembered there as aloof, preachy and inconsistent.
For the authorities in places such as Budapest and Warsaw, Mr Trump’s election was excellent news. Hostility towards migrants, economic protectionism and a disrespectful approach to political convention are no longer taboo. Headstrong politicians such as Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s prime minister, or Jarosław Kaczynski, the ruling party’s chief in Poland, can now argue that they are merely taking the same line as the leader of the free world.
Mr Trump’s rapturously received speech in Warsaw this year vehemently defended national sovereignty and freedom but barely mentioned democracy. Responding to what conservative Poles see as the European Union’s bossy secularism, he decried the (unnamed) forces that sought to “erase the bonds of culture, faith and tradition”.
Even those who dislike Mr Trump’s politics are happy with his administration’s help in defending them against the Kremlin. America is selling Patriot missiles to Poland and has deployed a deterrent force there. US special forces are in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, working with local reservists and others to prepare resistance in the event of a Russian invasion. American military ties with non-Nato Sweden and Finland have never been stronger.
In Washington, Congress showers money on European defence, not just in bolstering the military deterrent but also for counter-propaganda and other softer forms of security.
The shambles of the past is no guide to the present. Wess Mitchell, the State Department official in charge of Europe, is a hawkish heavyweight who has devoted his career to the security of central and eastern Europe. Fiona Hill, the Russia director at the National Security Council, is a widely respected expert and co-author of a sizzlingly critical biography of Mr Putin. (Disclosure: both are friends of mine.)
At a more senior level, Mike Pence, the vice president, is pitch-perfect in his commitment to containing Russia and defending allies. So is Jim Mattis, the defence secretary, and HR McMaster, the national security adviser.
That contrasts sharply with the Obama-era White House, where America’s European allies frequently struggled to get a hearing and senior officials all too often pooh-poohed their concerns.
Mr Obama’s disastrous “reset” of relations with Russia in 2009 sacrificed allies’ interests in the illusory hope of a rapprochement with the Kremlin. His administration abruptly cancelled a hard-fought missile-defence base in Poland, and did so on September 17, the anniversary of the Soviet invasion in 1939.
As that woeful timing suggests, the State Department was in a mess then too. John Kerry, the former secretary of state, preferred personal diplomatic crusades to reforming the dysfunctional bureaucracy he bequeathed to Rex Tillerson.
The Obama administration also fiercely resisted congressional efforts to impose sanctions on Russia.
Mr Trump’s crude threats to withdraw security guarantees from countries that do not spend 2 per cent of GDP on defence breached the rhetorical rules. However they spurred more spending. European countries have finally started defence planning and coordination — albeit pragmatically; grandiose dreams of a European army remain just that.
The biggest result of the increased focus on defence is the bleak realisation that dangers are growing and that European countries, regardless of whether they are in or out of the EU and Nato, have no chance of defending themselves without American help.
We may find Mr Trump aesthetically and morally reprehensible. But in many respects that directly concern us and our allies, his administration is still markedly better than its predecessor.
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/t...bama-bcr82cr8p
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