Neramumai islamo pasaulyje (AF, SY, IQ, EG, LY, TN, DZ, MA, YE, BH, ...)

[index]

Ar tik taip atrodo ar arabai karinėje srityje apskritai visi moliai ir sugeba efektyviai kariauti tik nekonvencinį karą (visokie civilių bauginimai ir IED aka Daesh). To paties Irako kariuomenė turėdama modernią ginkluotę pabėgo išsigandusi savižudžių sprogdintojų. Sirijos irgi panašiai.

O efektyviai kariauti gali tik su JAV, europiečių (ar rusų) konsultantais.

[John]

Confirmintas tik vienas pristatymas, visa kita spekuliacijos

John, jie butent ir yra moliai technikos turi, bet zmoniu mokanciu ir galinciu ja naudotis - ne Imkim ta pati Jemeno-Saudu konflikta, Saudu bombos pastoviai krenta ant ligoniniu, gamyklu (pvz coca-cola), muzieju, valstybes administraciniu pastatu, civiliniu pagrindiniu gatviu piko metu ir pan. Kitaip sakant visur, bet ne ant kariniu objektu Kas is to, kad sakykim saudai prasivers pro prieslektuvine gynyba laivuose ir zemyne, jei jie metys bombas fermose, civiliams ant galvu ir kurnors vietines reikesmes cemento fabrikuose? Pazeis Irano infrastruktura? Oh please Be dedes Obamos palaiminimo saudai tokiu bairiu nedarytu, o Obama i tokio tipo kara - nei uz ka nesivels, jau dabar padai svyla del Jemeno ir Sirijos

Iranas neturi pakankamo kiekio moderniu naikintuvu, bet uztat turi neblogai isvystyta prieslektuvine gynyba, kuri paremta nukopijuotom JAV ir ruskiu technologijom ir vietoj patobulinta. JAV tai butu riesutas, kuri vistiek sutrauskytu, bet Saudams - misija neimanoma

Bet tai yra labai keista, jeigu jie prisipirkę tokius kiekius naujausios technikos (pagal kurią yra viena geriausiai apsiginklavusių kariuomenių), bet nemoka ja anudotis. Tai negi jų niekas neapmoko? Tie patys amerikiečiai? Negi ten visi tokie debilai, kad perkasi daiktus už bbž kiek milijardų $ ir po to nežino, kaip juos naudoti ir su kuo valgyti? Kodėl tuomet jie tai išvis daro?

[Aleksio]

Bet tai yra labai keista, jeigu jie prisipirkę tokius kiekius naujausios technikos (pagal kurią yra viena geriausiai apsiginklavusių kariuomenių), bet nemoka ja anudotis. Tai negi jų niekas neapmoko? Tie patys amerikiečiai? Negi ten visi tokie debilai, kad perkasi daiktus ir po to nežino, kaip juos naudoti ir su kuo valgyti? Kodėl tuomet jie tai išvis daro?

O kodėl žmonės kartais perka visokius blizgučius, nors neturi pinigų normaliai pavalgyti?

[ViR2]

Pavalgyt jie turi uz ka ir galetu drasiai Janukovycius batonus ciaumot kasdien

Ar tik taip atrodo ar arabai karinėje srityje apskritai visi moliai ir sugeba efektyviai kariauti tik nekonvencinį karą (visokie civilių bauginimai ir IED aka Daesh). To paties Irako kariuomenė turėdama modernią ginkluotę pabėgo išsigandusi savižudžių sprogdintojų. Sirijos irgi panašiai.

O efektyviai kariauti gali tik su JAV, europiečių (ar rusų) konsultantais.

Training in Arab armies reflects this: rather than prepare as much as possible for the multitude of improvised responsibilities that are thrown up in the chaos of battle, Arab soldiers, and their officers, are bound in the narrow functions assigned them by their hierarchy. That this renders them less effective on the battlefield, let alone places their lives at greater risk, is scarcely of concern, whereas, of course, these two issues are dominant in the American military culture, and are reflected in American military training.

Why Arabs loose wars

[John]

O kaip yra Irano kariuomenėje?

[ViR2]

Jei turesi laiko, uzmesk aki i sita knyga. Pakankamai padoriai papasakota apie galias regione:
The Gulf military balance

Irano kariuomene irgi nera stebuklinga. Bet ji gerokai laisviau suformuota ir valdoma nei arabu saliu kariuomenes + IRGC struktura ir vadovavimo metodika kopijuota nuo vakaru ir eiliniai turi didesne laisve. Bet egzistuoja tas pats commander-god kultas, nors ir ne toks ryskus

Saudai turedami tokius pajegumus, vis dar nesugeba nusluoti Jemeno nuo zemes pavirsiaus:


O del Irano rankos uz Jemeno, tai:


Nuotrauka, apibudinanti dabartinius frontus Sirijoje:

"In one instance, analysis of some blood samples indicates that individuals were at some point exposed to sarin or a sarin-like substance," Uzumcu said. "Further investigation would be necessary to determine when or under what circumstances such exposure might have occurred."

The Syrian government has long accused opposition fighters, who have been seeking for nearly five years to oust the country's president, of using chemical weapons. Western-backed rebels in Syria have repeatedly denied using chemical weapons.

Reuters

Investigating possible use of irritant chemicals as a weapon

With regard to the alleged incidents in Jobar on 29 August 2014 (for details, see my earlier posting), al-Maliha on 16 April 2014 and 11 July 2014, al Kabbas, Damascus on 10 September 2014 and Nubel and al-Zahraa on 8 January 2015, the report offers parallel conclusions. These are:

The affected soldiers ‘may have been exposed to some type of non-persistent, irritating airborne substance, secondary to the surface impact of the launched objects’.
The investigators could not determine with any degree of confidence as to whether exposure was the consequence of the irritant being delivered as the payload of a projectile, or whether the irritant had another source of origin (combustion product of a propellant, detonation of a conventional or improvised explosive device on a stored chemical already in-situ, some combination of substances mixed with surface soil and dust, or a combination of all mentioned factors).
The affected soldiers in question present clinical symptoms that are ‘consistent with a brief exposure to any number of chemicals or environmental insults’. Furthermore, ‘the visual and olfactory description of the potential irritating substance does not clearly indicate any specific chemical’.

In each of the five cases, the investigators pointed out that the lack of hard evidence precluded them from gathering facts in a definitive way. Little ‘objective evidence’ was made available to the team to complement the materials given by the Syrian authorities, ‘either because it was unavailable or because it was not generated in the first place’.

According to Note Verbale 41 (29 May 2015), a follow-up to the initial document submitted by the Syrian government on 15 December 2014 that led to the FFM investigation, eight military personnel became casualties in an alleged CW incident on 15 February 2015. It provided a brief description of the incident, signs and symptoms, a more precise location, the hospital where casualties received treatment, and the names of the victims. The incident appeared sufficiently grave for the FFM to investigate it.

The FFM conducted interviews with medical staff and casualties relevant to the allegation and visited hospitals and research laboratories where tests on victim blood samples had been conducted. It also visited the Centre for Studies and Scientific Research Institute in Barzi, Damascus, on 12 and 14 August 2015. On the first day, team members had a discussion with the head of the research institute on the storage and research methods for blood collected for acetyl-cholinesterase (AChE) analysis and were made aware of the existence of several blood samples stored onsite related to the Darayya incident. Two days later the FFM revisited the institute to seal the selected blood samples.

In the course of the investigation the FFM received a variety of documents, including battlefield and medical reports, video footage and images from GoogleEarth indicating exact locations. These documents included the medical records of the eight reported casualties and the AChE analyses of six alleged victims. In several cases the investigators were granted access to requested documents, albeit without being provided with photocopies. Four of the reported casualties were given HI-6 (asoxime chloride) and dematropine, both nerve agent antidotes.

The retrieved blood samples were forwarded to OPCW-certified laboratories for analysis and a certified laboratory conducted DNA analysis to link the samples to the casualties.

In its medical review the FFM report draws a sharp distinction with the other investigated Syrian allegations:

The Darayya incident was the only reviewed incident wherein the alleged victims had a prolonged recovery phase of 10-12 days. This departed from all other alleged incidents wherein recovery was rapid and rarely resulted in hospital observation for more than two nights. Darayya is also the only alleged incident wherein antidotes and specific treatments such as oximes and atropine were employed, or were even mentioned. Finally, and perhaps most notably, this was the only incident wherein blood analysis was performed with quantitative results noted in the medical records. Though such results are precisely the type of objective evidence the medical team would have preferred to have had in the aforementioned incidents, in the case of Darayya the presented test results proved more confounding than helpful, as they were significantly outside of the expected range for such a scenario.

As a consequence, the report notes, the recovered blood samples had to be forwarded to an independent laboratory for further assessment. The final results were still pending when the report was issued. In its absence the medical evaluation necessarily rests on the interviews and provided documents, but given the shortcomings of the methodology and gaps, these merely contribute to the uncertainties that permeate the entire report on the allegations by the Syrian authorities. (It should be noted that Appendixes 8 and 9 provide detailed results of the analyses of the blood samples suggesting exposure to neurotoxicants in all tested samples collected from casualties, so that paragraph 90 of the report may either indicate failure to delete language from an earlier draft or point to additional laboratory testing.)

All the evidence collected from Idlib province leaves little doubt that government units were responsible for those attacks. Concerning the mustard agent attack at Marea, the report does not implicate the Syrian government despite the certainty of its conclusions. Press and NGO reports have pointed the finger to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The OPCW and Iraq are collaborating on the investigation into a similar incident implicating ISIL near Mosul last summer.

Syrian soldiers exposed to Sarin

Sorry for long post, here's a cookie from Latakia

[ViR2]

Dar biskely apie Irana:

The growing geostrategic importance of the Caspian Sea has been reflected in the growing Iranian military emphasis on it. Whether it is the threats of the powerful Russian Caspian Flotilla wanting to retain power over the Caspian or Azerbaijan’s overlapping claims with Western backing, Iran feels backed into a corner. Thus having a doctrine of being able to operate with ‘the command head cut off’, pushing a martyr morale throughout their military, and emphasizing tools to conduct area-denial operations makes the Iranian military a formidable opponent. It is potentially the hydra lurking beneath the surface of the Caspian’s contested waters, making an impact far beyond the immediate region./

[ViR2]

Trumpa dokumentika apie Fatemiyon divizija Sirijoje:

[ViR2]

Labai didele naujiena!

Ahrar al-Sham's chief in #Homs, Abu Rateb (former Liwa al-Haq leader) has been assassinated by gunmen.

PT: Sheikh Abu Rateb was a member of Ahrar al-Sham’s ruling Shura Council. He was shot dead while driving in Al-Farhaniya in northern #Homs.

Pranesa pats Charles Lister, todel 101% tiesa Jihadistai isgaudomi po viena ir nuostabus paskutinis 30d tarpas - Aloushas, o dabar sitas... Beliko nukept Shishani, Baghdadi ir Golani (Joulani) iki pilnos laimes.

Tuo tarpu VICE ir toliau ciuozia zemyn versdamiesi per galva, kaip isaukstint jihadistus. Gaila, anksciau laikiau fantastisku saltiniu gerai zurnalistikai...
Postina ir raso fake'us, o negana to, naudoja senus fake'us is 2013 metu

[index]

Galima plačiau, kokia čia istorija su tuo vaiku?

[ViR2]

Vice jau pasalino straipsni, kai pradejo is ju saipytis visas twiteris esme tokia, kad stumiamas naratyvas, jog Sirijos miestas Madaya yra apsuptas ir blokuojama betkokia pagalba i ji ir betkokie srautai is jo. Civiliai buktai neisleidziami, o piktas Assadas laukia kol visi ismirs badu...

Realybe biski kitokia miestas net neapsuptas armijos, yra dalis NDF kelio uzkardu, bet tik tiek. Puse metu su viduj sedincia al nusra ir maza dalim liwa al sham islamistu buvo vestos derybos, del "susitaikymo". Jo salygos buvo tokios, kad islamistams sudejusius sunkiuosius ginklus bus sutriktas transportas isvykti i Idliba, bet mainais jie turi ileisti humanitarine tarptautine ir vietine pagalba ir is miesto isleisti suzeistuosius ir sergancius civilius. Derybos nutruko del Aloush "nukalimo", o jihadistai nusprende civilius pasilikt skydui todel is visu jegu dabar visi pro rebel kanalai stumia marinimo badu naratyva, tam, kad uzspaustu Sirija atsitraukt nuo sio miesto, kurio net nelaiko apsupus, bet jis yra izoliuota kisene o ant visokiu Jihadi Julian (bild vyr redaktorius) ir Charles Lister (the daily beast) stumiamos propagandos pasimauna ir tokie grandai, kaip VICE. Turetume apie si miesta pamatyt straipsni Delfyje ant dienu, o dar garantuoju, kad ir sita vaika ides ir dar prides kruva kitu fake, kuriuos po bisky trina rimtesne ziniasklaida susigedusi

Beje, tam mieste tikrai civiliai negauna maisto, bet negauna todel, kad jihadistai neleidzia ir sau susigrobia visus shipmentus. Pastaruju fb ir twiterio profiliai nukrauti maistu dabar twiteryje net trendina

[J.U.]

Galima plačiau, kokia čia istorija su tuo vaiku?

O nafig veisti 10 vaikų kai jų negali išmaitinti?

[ViR2]

na ten problema, kad jihadistai blokuoja civilius ir neleidzia jiems isvykti isigyt maisto ir taip pat neleidzia jokiai pagalbai patekti i miesta, o viska vercia ant valdzios, kaip ir iprasta su vaiku kiekiu tai nesusije

Trumpas klipas:
https://twitter.com/Souria4Syrians/s...59608946552833

Ka galetu padaryt Sirija, tai isiverzti i miesta ir sulyginti su zemem jihadistus, kad isgelbetu civilius

[ViR2]

Delfi keicia retorika

Štai, dar 2013 metų rugsėjį „Laisvosios Sirijos armijos“ ir al-Nusra fronto sukilėliai užpuolė seną krikščionių kalnų gyvenvietę, piligrimystės vietą Malulą, nusiaubė krikščionių bažnyčią, sudaužė jos statulas, sudegino šventus paveikslus, iš vidaus iki pat kupolo išdegino šv. Teklos vienuolyno šventovę. Suklupdę tikinčiuosius, vertė juos išsižadėti krikščionybės ir tapti musulmonais. Šiame 3000 gyventojų turinčiame miestelyje su dviem vienuolynais iki šiol tebekalbama aramėjų kalba.

Skaitykite daugiau: http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithu....d?id=69997944

[John]

Delfi keicia retorika



Skaitykite daugiau: http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithu....d?id=69997944

Apie Maaloula buvo geras BBC reportažas iš ten. Dabar lyg ir back to normal viskas ten?

[J.U.]

Esminė vieta yra ši, rodanti kaip galima tikėti ir pasitikėti musulmonais:

Kitas Malulos gyventojas, Majdas Haddadas, saugojęs šventojo Sergijaus vienuolyną, po to prisipažino, kad baisiausia jam buvo ne pats užpuolimas, o kaimynų musulmonų, su kuriais ligi šiol gyvenęs kaip su broliais, elgesys: jie džiūgaudami parėmę užpuolikus.

Skaitykite daugiau: http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithu....d?id=69997944

[Galis]

Esminė vieta yra ši, rodanti kaip galima tikėti ir pasitikėti musulmonais:

o ar ne kažkaip panašiai su kaimynais buvo donbase arba per trėmimus Lietuvoje?

[J.U.]

o ar ne kažkaip panašiai su kaimynais buvo donbase arba per trėmimus Lietuvoje?

Panašiai, žinoma. Lietuvoj buvo dar blogiau, nes visi buvo vienos tautybės ir tikybos.

[John]

O kas patvarkė tą Ahrar al Sham barzduką? Quds?

[luknas]

Vladimiras Putinas kovai su „Islamo valstybe“ kuria naują ginklą – ypatingas žiurkes