Neramumai islamo pasaulyje (AF, SY, IQ, EG, LY, TN, DZ, MA, YE, BH, ...)

[ViR2]

„Hezbollah“ karo instruktoriaus Assiro teigimu, rusai vis labiau nusivilia Sirijos vyriausybės pajėgų sugebėjimais ir daugiau iniciatyvos perduoda į drąsių ir gerai treniruotų libaniečių rankas. „Mes patys mokome sirus, kaip naudotis naujausia ginkluote“, – išdidžiai teigė teroristas.

Tokie teiginiai jau visiskas saves liaupsinimas Tuo labiau, kad Hezbollah (Libano) pragrinde trinasi tik ties Libano pasieniu, pietu fronte nedalyvauja, siaures fronte nedalyvauja, tik dar siek tiek pasivaidena ties centrine Sirija, kaip kad Mahin, ar Quaryatayin.

Priesingai nei jis pucias, ruskiai neduoda jokiu advanced ginklu ir remia smulkia ginkluote, kuria gauna per Sirija, o ne tiesiogiai.

Nauja spekuliacija:

Sirija gali stumtis link Idlibo izoliacijos, uzdarant pukuotukams aprupinimo kanala is Azazo, kertant pro Rojavos "pasieni" iki Turkijos sienos ir nuo ten judant zemyn. Pora geresniu komentaru is Reddito:

This is the most sensible strategy. If the regime forces go at Idlib from the east, they will have to clear other rebel strongholds like Saraqeb, Teftanaz, and Bennish. If they go at it from the north, the only serious obstacle is Atareb(and another thing: if they go at Idlib from the north, their rear won't be exposed because the Afrin YPG is to their north - Afrin SDF are also likely to attack the rebels when regime is close to Bab Hawa to grab a bit of territory as well, making things easier for the regime). So first, they will dash west, until reaching the Turkish border, and then, dash south, until they reach Fuah and Kufraya, lifting the siege, and use them as an anchor before the campaign ends with the storming of Idlib.

Events are proceeding at a very fast pace. The Army is 1 or 2 villages away from Al-Bab, and they are a few hundred meters away from Deir Hafir, literally on the outskirts. SDF are going to capture Manbij pretty soon at current pace, and it's doubtful Jarablus will last for much longer after that. This all means that Wilayat Aleppo is finished, SAA and SDF are partitioning it between themselves as we speak, the 4 cities I mentioned are the only ones Daesh hold in Aleppo. Because of the state of peace between the army and the SDF, skeleton crews can be left to defend these areas by the regime, and the rest can be redeployed for the Idlib operations.

And people were laughing when loyalists proclaimed that reclaiming Idlib and Jisr Shughur is the strategic goal of the operation back in October. Yet here they are, getting closer every week.

It should also be noted that another matter of significance is that if the regime forces succeed in their plans to reach Baba Hawa, they will take Afrin canton hostage. Afrin is defended by mountains on every side, except for 2 corridors, the northern, and southern. The entrance into the northern corridor is in Turkey. The entrance into the southern corridor is 10 or so kilometers north of Bab Hawa. So if the SDF get any ideas about trying to demolish the regime pockets in Hasakah and Qamishli, the regime will be able to quickly respond by moving in on Afrin from the south.

I laughed at Idlib and Jisr Shughour being the targets because at the time the regime was running tanks into the Ghab Plain and getting chewed up, almost as if they wanted to recapture their salient. THAT was a stupid idea. Idlib is probably also the least government friendly province in Syria; makes things rough.

I thought the SAA+Allies would try to isolate Idlib with offensives from all sides, which I think makes sense. Focusing irrationally on the urban areas didn't make any sense, and since the Russian intervention they haven't been doing that. Pin the rebels in a smaller geographic area where you can have tighter lines of defense and concentrate firepower easier. Same deal with reducing the Ghouta and Homs pockets.

There won't be a decisive victory here like it seemed the Russians imagined at first; it'll be like the anti-ISIS campaign. Long, slow degrading of the rebels capabilities with pressure coming from all sides.

After this I will never again doubt the government's seriousness about maintaining its territorial integrity. They're really trying to outlast the rebellion. I thought, "Oh, ok, Idlib. Small provincial capital where SAA has near zero support. Ever heard of any Idlib NDF? Yeah, uh huh- none outside of Fua + Kefraya. Idlib was an occupation, big deal." But the government isn't going for decisive victories on any fronts. They're maintaining a presence everywhere and trying to win the war of attrition.

Government still has not recaptured Morek, Jisr, Ariha, Idlib, Qarytayn, Military Center in West Aleppo, or Palmyra, which is important to keep in mind, but they are pursuing their own strategy on their own time and terms. Shows maturity in their decision making. Restablishing the salient in Idlib wouldn't have accomplished anything, it would have fallen down again. They're attacking things they want to hold forever and focusing on degrading the rebels, not holding terrain.

[ViR2]

Stambulo sprogdintojas:

The alleged attacker is Nabil Fadli, born in Saudi Arabia in 1988, Turkish officials said. He recently entered Turkey through Syria, officials said. Fadli was not on a watch list, Turkey's Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmus said.

http://abcnews.go.com/International/...ry?id=36230656

Kai pagalvoji - tik pries keleta savaiciu buvau ten...

[ViR2]

Video apie Salma isvadavima:

Atsiprasau, kad ruskiu kanalas, neklauskit ka kalba, nes Siru balsus uzstoja ruskiu, o pastaruju - nesuprantu Kiek pavyko suprast, tai lyg ir teisingai pranesa, nes Salma buvo pagrinde Nusros, mazos dalies Ahrar ir 1st coastal division okupuota. Pastarieji pirmieji pasitrauke ir paskuo juos bego Nusra.

Isvadavus Salma, pukuotukai bego neatsisukdami ir pavyko tuo pat metu isvaduod didesne teritorija:

[ViR2]

Labai neblogas al Monitor straipsnis apie visas Sirijos paliaubas. Dedu visa, nes gan koncentruotas ir verta skaityt su pilnu kontekstu

What are the real goals behind local truces in Syria?

Under one of the latest truces, in Homs, the opposition battalions’ militants took their light weapons on Dec. 8 and left al-Waer neighborhood for the countryside of Idlib in the north after a five-month siege on the city.

Also, a deal led opposition fighters in long-besieged Zabadani to leave with their families on Dec. 28 toward Lebanon, Turkey and the Idlib countryside. The truce aimed to implement the September agreement reached in Turkey between an Iranian delegation and one from the opposition umbrella group Jaish al-Fatah (Army of Conquest).

On Dec. 1, a delegation of notables representing Jabhat al-Nusra in al-Waer neighborhood met with regime representatives — including the head of the General Intelligence Directorate, Mohammed Dib Zaitoun, and the governor of Homs, Talal al-Barazi — under UN auspices through UN Ambassador in Syria Yacoub El Hillo.

The main directive of the resulting truce, which was implemented Dec. 9, provided for a complete cease-fire between the two parties and the exit of 270 fighters from Jabhat al-Nusra — which opposed the truce — to the countryside of Idlib in the north. The truce called for medium weapons to be handed over to the Syrian regime, humanitarian corridors to be opened into the neighborhood, the conditions of the remaining wanted people to be settled and a list of detainees held by the regime to be prepared for them to be released.

The regime says these truces serves the political solution process, but some activists and media outlets think the regime is seeking to empty these areas to prove its military strength and ability to manage the crisis. They say that the regime wants to kick-start the process of demographic change in the region and that it will not allow the displaced to return to their homes once the situation calms down.

In this context, France 24 website reported Dec. 18 that al-Waer residents refused to leave the neighborhood, as the truce had suggested, despite the miserable conditions there. The residents might fear that the Old Homs scenario will be repeated once they are out, and that the regime will never allow them to return. In April, the regime did not allow Old Homs residents to return following the deal between Jabhat al-Nusra and the regime there, even though the deal stated that the civilian citizens would be able to return.

Al-Monitor asked Anas Judeh, head of the opposition's Nation Building Movement, about the extent to which these truces might manage to end the armed conflict and solve the Syrian conflict.

“From the Russian standpoint, the agreements currently reached with armed groups in regime-controlled areas are the result of the Vienna II agreement signed in October 2015 calling for clearing the ‘useful’ Syrian areas of undisciplined armed groups that are incompatible with international agreements," Judeh said. "This paves the way for a stable environment, which can set the stage for a political process that Russia can apply and invoke with the United States, thus extending the international conflict” over how to handle Syria.

According to Judeh, Moscow believes that to solve the Syrian crisis, terrorism must be countered first and Syria must be rescued from extremist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State (IS) through Russia’s military presence. Only then can a transitional phase that includes Bashar al-Assad be discussed.

“We should be careful not to end up with a serious social fracture or animosities among the Syrian people," Judeh added. "Putting an end to the military conflict and transferring thousands of armed men along with their families to ‘remote’ regions is not enough. After all, these, along with their children, will only be ticking time bombs. Social, cultural and political work is essential to reintegrate them within the Syrian community. War on the extremist and terrorist ideology is not limited to military means alone, as it also includes cultural, social and political aspects.”

Instead of ending the conflict, Judeh said, sending fighters to other areas only serves to entrench the problem and might ultimately divide Syria into separate areas controlled by the regime, IS, Jabhat al-Nusra and the Kurds.

Some critics say the regime's efforts are an attempt to prove it can reach compromises that could end the Syrian war. The regime, they say, is trying to prove it should be a key player in the next phase, which would enhance its power centers in regime-controlled areas. This would subsequently lead to the deterioration of truces given that they were not reached under appropriate conditions, and especially given the absence of neutral observers.

Al-Monitor met with Reem Turkmani, head of the Madani Organization and a member of the board of the Syrian Civil Coalition. Turkmani said, “To begin with, what the regime is doing cannot be described as reconciliations. These are agreements whose main parties are military bodies seeking to achieve their interests through negotiations, not fighting.”

He added, “We may witness more local agreements, but there is no guarantee of continuity given the absence of observers, human rights organizations to follow up on the prisoners’ situation or independent mediators. And there is no political will to reach a solution.”

Turkmani told Al-Monitor that the best solution is for Syrians — be they civilians or militants — to stay in their areas. But some of them are forced to leave for two reasons. First, there is no third party, such as international observers, capable of protecting those who are most vulnerable to the risk of arrest. Therefore, some people prefer to leave out of fear of being arrested or forced into conscription, which could lead to their death.

Second, not all truces go as smoothly as those in Zabadani and al-Waer. For example, on Dec. 25, there were signs of an unprecedented deal that would have allowed IS militants to exit the southern Damascus districts of al-Qadam and al-Hajar toward Raqqa, the organization’s stronghold. Under the deal, buses would have transported the militants through areas under the control of Jaish al-Islam and then head to Raqqa. However, the deal failed, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, after Jaish al-Islam Cmdr. Zahran Alloush was killed Dec. 24.

But a civilian activist from al-Qadam said Jaish al-Islam wasn't involved at all with the failed truce.

"IS is the reason behind the deal's failure. They did not want to get out at once without knowing who would be governing the areas that they were leaving," the activist, who oversees the Facebook page of the Local Council of al-Qadam in Damascus, told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity. “Jaish al-Islam has nothing to do with this. The buses arrived the morning of Dec. 25 and waited in vain as IS members refused to leave.”

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/orig...#ixzz3xIbE64mA

[ViR2]

Stumiami Daesh pukuotukai is siaures Aleppo, puole visa jega Deir Ez Zor, kuri nuo 2014 laiko apsupe. Pilnas twitteris skirtingu ziniu ir informacijos, su kruva skirtingos info, tai postintu is ziniu:

Moments ago, horrific reports emerged that militants loyal to the Islamic State (ISIS) have executed hundreds of civilians in Deir Ez-Zor amidst a huge offensive to capture Al-Bughayliyah and Ayyash; although the overall death toll is unknown for now, some 280 civilians, many whom were women and children, are believed to have been executed at point blank range allegedly due to their allegiance with the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). Among those reported dead, only 5 were captured SAA soldiers.

Earlier today, some 28 government troops were also killed in clashes with ISIS at the Deir Ez-Zor districts of Ayyash, Haweeqa, and Al-Bughayliyah. Todays ISIS offensive was well-planned as tens of ISIS suicide bombers rushed across the Euphrates river by boat as to overwhelm local Syrian Army defenders. Meanwhile, other fighters attacked Ayyash from the northern flank.

Upon entering the suburbs, ISIS militants summarily executed all people they could get their hands on before fleeing the area entirely. Sadly, children as young as 8 months old were executed during these horrible events. Many SAA soldiers have relatives in this area and Al-Bughayliyah has long been a Syrian Army stronghold; these facts hint to the reasons behind the attack.

The city of Deir Ez-Zor has been entirely besieged by the Islamic State since late 2014. Nevertheless, government troops of the Syrian Arab Army’s 104th Airborne Brigade of the Republican Guard still maintain control of about 50 % of the city. If ISIS was to capture the city of Deir Ez-Zor, this would free up much needed troops for the Aleppo front which has largely collapsed near al-Bab and Manbij.

Al Masdar News

[Forumo_Dalyvis]

Turbūt pirmą kartą LIetuvos žiniasklaidoje straipsnis apie Al Nusrą.

Grupuotė, pavojingesnė ir už ISIS: tik laiko klausimas, kada jie parodys savo tikrąjį veidą

Kaip matau, šita tema truputį užmigusi, nes ją daugiausiai naujindavo tik vienas žmogus, kuris dabar kažkur dingęs su visomis naujienomis. O naujienų per tą laiką būta daug - SAA vėl stipriai pajudėjo pirmyn, opozicijos pajėgos prarado daug teritorijų Latakijos provincijoje į šiaurę nuo Salmos (turbūt tik laiko klausimas, kada jie bus išstumti iš Latakijos - dabar opozicija kontroliuoja nedidelį žemės lopinėlį Turkijos pasienyje).

Pietinėje Daraa provincijoje SAA iš opozicijos perėmė strategiškai svarbų Sheikh Miskin miestą.

[balietis]

Nežinau, gal kam aktualu. Nuo 2015 gruodžio 18 dienos kai kam nustoja galioti Visa Waiver Program, leidžianti vykti į JAV be vizos.
http://www.cbp.gov/travel/internatio...ention-act-faq

Nationals of VWP countries who have traveled to or been present in Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria on or after March 1, 2011 (with limited exceptions)

[Dadis]

Rusijos aviacija bombarduoja civilius Sirijoje? Be abejo, civilams Sirijoje kliūna nuo visų pusių.
O ką daro didžioji Vakarų draugė Saudo Arabija Jemene? Tą patį:

UN report into Saudi-led strikes in Yemen raises questions over UK role
http://www.theguardian.com, 2016.01.27

A United Nations panel investigating the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen has uncovered “widespread and systematic” attacks on civilian targets in violation of international humanitarian law, raising questions over UK arms exports to Saudi Arabia and the role of British military advisers.

[ViR2]

Senai buvau prisijunges, tai siek tiek info:
Naujienos is pietu Aleppo fronto:

Tai Hassan al Nimr (tiger) pajegos. Mano nuomone, tai vieninteles SAA pajegos kompetetingos ir be ruskiu pagalbos. Klipe matomas labia idomus dalykas, Tiger forces naudoja Gvosdikas ir artilerija susilpninti daesh pozicijas, tada puolima vykdo tankais ir tankai yra puolimo smaigalys, po to jie uzleidzia vieta BMP arba techniniam transportui, kuris iveza pestininkus, o tankai perima support role. Sakyciau, kad pagaliau ismoko moderniai kariaut

Is kitu naujienu, tai nuosaikioji al qaeda ir susijusios islamistu grupuotes jau beveik yra isstumtos is Latakijos. Liko tik pora stambesniu kaimu ir latakijoj nebebus jihadistu ir kitu siuksliu nei kvapo

Dar galiu paminet vakaryksti siaures Hama jihadistu puolima, kuriame pirmu smuiku grojo Jabhat al Nusra (moderate democratic al qaeda) ir FSA 1st coastal division. Puolimo tikslas buvo visiskai neaiskus, nes, kaip diversiniam puolimui buvo perdaug masyvus ir jihadistai atitrauke savo pajegas is Latakijos fronto. Kaip bebutu, jie buvo nustumti dar toliau nei ju pozicijos pries puolima ir tai buvo visiskas ir totalus jihadistu fail Fanboy's net dali pranesimu apie puolima pasisalino is twiterio



Kadangi Latakia frontas jau po bisky uzsidaro ir nebelieka jame jihadistu, dalis ju bando pabegt per Turkijos pasieni. Stai kaip atrodo Ahrar/Nusra/FSA ir kiti jihadistai pasivadine pabegeliais Dalis "pabegeliu" su karinem uniformom, o dar vienas net ir su balaclava


Ir pabaigai, info is Latakia:

[Forumo_Dalyvis]

SAA ir Hezbollah perėmė Tal Jibbin šiaurės Alepe. Panašu, kad sieks susijungti su Asado kontroliuojamu Zahraa anklavu, bei su Kurdų korntroliuojamu Afrino regionu, ir tokiu būdu apsupti sukilėlius i šiaurinės pusės. Dabar atstumas - 7 km. Taip pat pastarosiomis dienomis plečiasi Asado kontroliuojama terotorija aplink Kuveirės bazę (į vakarinę pusę) - sąskaita kaimų, vienas po kito atimamų iš daesh.

[ViR2]

SAA/Najuba al Hezbollah/Hezbollah/al Badr nestums daugiau i siaure Galiu lazintis, kad tai tera tik arba diversija arba pasibandymas. Siaures Aleppo pernelyg mazos SAA pajegos tam, o ir al Nusra imete +-800 jihadistu gint koridoriui. Tam, kad galetu islaisvint Aleppa ir rimciau pakenkt jihadistam, visu pirma butinas Rashidin uzeimas, tada Khan al Asal (vakaru Aleppo). Platesniu veiksmu imtis negales tol, kol Tiger forces nebaigs valyti Daesh kisenes rytu Aleppo, o tam dar minimum savaite.

Nubl ir Zahraa yra gerai aprupinamos "kisenes", nes per YPG/SDF tiekimas nestoja. Problemos buna tik jei tenka susidurt su Jaish al Thuwar kurie maziau palankus Sirijai. Todel tiekimo per Turkija uzdarymas nera pioritetas siuo metu, bent jau tol, kol Latakijos fronto neuzbaige iki galo ir Daesh nenuvijo nuo Quaratayin vidurio Sirijoje

[Gator]

Kažkaip daug mažiau straipsnių apie ISIS ir apskritai neramumus medijoje palygnus sakykim su pora ar keliais mėnesiais atgal. Ar tiesiog pabodo, ar konspiracija neeskaluoti to, ar viskas rimsta po truputį?

[ViR2]

Kad ir kaip beziuretum, pritartum Sirijai ar palaikytum pukuotukus, Daesh issiseme Daesh nebeturi nei zmogiskosios galios nei resursu rengti plataus masto puolimus, galiausiai po Kobanes ir Sinjaro nebebuvo nei vieno plataus masto Daesh puolimo. Prasciausiai del to, jog tose susiburimo vietose, kuriose jie grasina SDF arba al Nusra/Jaish al fateh/ahrar al sham/kitiem vakaru rememiems pukuotukams - gauna smugius is koalicijos. Ten, kur grasina Sirijos pagejoms - smugiuoja rusas. Rusas apskritai visus ju tiekimo kanalus suarde ir sumale, o kolonas centrinej Sirijoje medzioja su Mi-24, kuriu pora pastoviai kursuoja be konkrecios uzduoties gaudydama tiekimo kolonas tarp Daesh ir Qalamoun kalnu

Taip pat, visos imanomos Daesh istorijos jau buvo ispasakotos ir po bisky daesh bus isstumta tiek Irake, tiek Sirijoje. Taciau... Apie ka mazai kalba tai yra kas vyksta Libijoje, Alzyre ir Jemene Sirijoje ir Irake daesh po bisky atsitraukia nuo "state warfare" iki "guerrilla warfare", o va Jemene, Libijoje ir Alzyre - kelia sparnus Kolkas labai stipriai matoma tik Libijoje ir Jemene, bet siom dienom Alzyras irgi jau nebesusitvarko.

Tikekis medijoje pamatyt daugiau pranesimu apie Al Nusra (al Qaeda in Syria) ir ju artimiausius draugelius Ahrar al Sham ir Jaish al Islam. Pastaruosius du labai stipriai remia Saudai su Kataru ir per savo valdoma ziniasklaida bando juos pateikt, kaip nekaltus pukuotukus

Kalbant apie pukuotukus:
Irako Siitu burys paime i pasala Jaish al Fateh vakarietiskus teroristus, kas is ju liko:
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=9ba_1454316793

FSA Division 16 teroristai infiltravos i Bashkoy kaimeli ir su RPG papleskino Siru BMP Atkreipkit demesi i 0:02 "Sieg Heil" Siaip drasus akbarai

Tas pats kaimas/vieta/laikas is Sirijos puses:

[index]

FSA Division 16 teroristai infiltravos i Bashkoy kaimeli ir su RPG papleskino Siru BMP Atkreipkit demesi i 0:02 "Sieg Heil" Siaip drasus akbarai

Tai, kad tie BMP atrodė kaip numesti ir palikti. Vienas būdamas nepamuštas nei judėjo, nei bandė atsakyti ugnimi į tą pusę.

O "Sieg Heil" tai kietai. Mėgsta islamistai panaciukuot.

[ViR2]

Man rodos, kad tas kuris buvo nepamustas lyg ir viksra buvo prapyples (1:56)... Bet vistiek jie tikrai nebuvo palikti kazkur pakrastyj, o juos pasiekt - reikejo kiausu Ne vien al nusra sugeba tokius fokusus prasukt

[Forumo_Dalyvis]

SAA/Najuba al Hezbollah/Hezbollah/al Badr nestums daugiau i siaure Galiu lazintis, kad tai tera tik arba diversija arba pasibandymas. Siaures Aleppo pernelyg mazos SAA pajegos tam, o ir al Nusra imete +-800 jihadistu gint koridoriui. Tam, kad galetu islaisvint Aleppa ir rimciau pakenkt jihadistam, visu pirma butinas Rashidin uzeimas, tada Khan al Asal (vakaru Aleppo). Platesniu veiksmu imtis negales tol, kol Tiger forces nebaigs valyti Daesh kisenes rytu Aleppo, o tam dar minimum savaite.

Nubl ir Zahraa yra gerai aprupinamos "kisenes", nes per YPG/SDF tiekimas nestoja. Problemos buna tik jei tenka susidurt su Jaish al Thuwar kurie maziau palankus Sirijai. Todel tiekimo per Turkija uzdarymas nera pioritetas siuo metu, bent jau tol, kol Latakijos fronto neuzbaige iki galo ir Daesh nenuvijo nuo Quaratayin vidurio Sirijoje

Panašu, kad vis dėlto toks atsargus įvertinimas nepasitvirtina. Šiandien proasadiškos pajėgos dar labiau stumiasi į priekį, ir opozicijos kontroliuojamas "kaklas" labai stipriai siaurėja:

https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/8122439/02_02.png

[ViR2]

OK, klydau Visgi bando sujungti su enklavu. Po siandienos jau uzblokavo tiekimo kanalus ir tiketina ryt per pietus jau bus sujunge jei jihadistai nieko naujo nesugalvos Smagu, pagrindinis tiekimo kanalas nutrauktas, o jei dar pavyktu normaliu FSA likucius istraukt is siaures jihadistu gniauztu ir juos prijungt prie SDF ar bent NDF - konflikto galas jau butu ranka pasiekiamas. Pietu FSA atemus Jaish al Islam yra daugiau maziau normali, neturi daug radikalu tarp saves ir nusra/al qaeda neturi ten daug zmoniu

Siaip, tai bent siuo atveju forumo dalyvis jokio melo ar "fog of war" nepasake

Jesolo, teks keist plokstele, atemus is Jihadistu Aleppo, tiketina, kad normaliu FSA likuciai susitars arba su SDF arba bus inkorporuoti i NDF, o visus JaF nusluos.

Keleta idomesniu reportazu is siaures Aleppo:

Paskutiniam video greiciausiai yra SAA, nes niekas Tocku Hezbollah neduodu, o jei duotu - Izraelis greitai sita nesusipratima issprestu

Susipazinimui, video, kaip atrodo siitu kovotojas is Kataib al Hezbollah (Iraqi paramilitary), kuris neteko brolio ir tevo kovodamas pries Daesh. Tokio optimizmo ir normalios snekos ir jokio al qaeda pukuotuko nepamatytum, kurie tik kebabu snackbar, inshallah, bismillah, bismillah ar rahman ar rahim ir panasiu bullshita reikalaujanti viengubo skaiciaus IQ tesugeba islement

[Jesolo]

Kuriame mano pranešime matei išreikštą palaikymą kuriai nors pusei? Manau, kad forumuose aktualiausia yra pasidalinti naujausia objektyvia informacija. Kam labiau rūpi asmeniškumai - siūlau sukurti jiems skirtą temą ir ten aiškintis, kas didesnis "ch*lo" ar dar kas nors, neofftopinant daugybei žmonių aktualiose temose.

na, as sita pranesima taikiau vir2. Bet, smagu, kad ir tu atsliepei.

[ViR2]

Man? Kad as niekad neslepiau, kad palaikau Sirija, o rusija palaikau tik siuo vieninteliu atzilgiu Paciam tuo pat pasiulymu deretu pasinaudot ir pasirasyt, kad palaikai al Qaeda ir sunni jihada

[ViR2]

Pasikeitus karo krypciai, pradejo gauset NDF gretos. Taip pat prasidejo pranesimai, kad mazeja priverstinio saukimo mastai (viena pagrindiniu jaunu pabegeliu priezasciu) ir armija nebegaudo jaunuoliu gatvese.
Juru pestininku atitikmuo SAA formuotej (Fawj Maghawir Al Bahar), pries issiuntima i paskutini Latakijos isvadavima (Kinssaba). Atkreipkit demesi i naujus 4x4, pagal gandus - gauna per oficialu Iraka (ne Shia grupuotes)


Grazus video is islaisvinto Homso (bent jau to, kas liko is jo siauriniu priemiesciu):

Daesh kontroliuojamas Quaryatayn:

Svieziai isvaduotas Sheikh Miskeen:

Damasko pagrindine ir garsioji Umayyad mecete (Sunni), Damasko perlas:

Siaures Aleppo mato vis daugiau T90 ir panasu, kad Harakat al Nujaba juos vairuoja


Naujausias Aleppo zemelapis. Raudonai pazymetas paskutinis jihadistu aprupinimo kelias i Aleppo centra


Tuo tarpu, demokratiski pukuotukai moko vaikus Jihado paslapciu:

The exam, which dealt with a scenario where the Army of Conquest coalition captures regime soldiers, shed light on commonly shared views regarding the rebel groups’ treatment of prisoners in the Idlib province.

The third question in the paper—which bears the stamp of the Syrian National Coalition’s Interim Government—reads as follows:

“[If] a number of Assad’s soldiers were captured in one of the Army of Conquest’s raids each of those fighters would [either] be handed over to Al-Nusra Front with a probability of 4 in 10, to Ahrar al-Sham with a probability of 3 in 10 [or] to Jund al-Aqsa.”

The question went on to state that “each fighter would then be executed by the faction that had received them either by shooting or beheading.”

“If they were handed over to Al-Nusra Front they would be executed by beheading with a probability of 6 in 10, if they were handed over to Ahrar al-Sham they would be executed by shooting with a probability of 7 in 10 and if they were handed over to Jund al-Aqsa they would be executed by beheading with a probability of 8 in 10.”

“So, if they were executed by beheading, what is the probability that they were handed over to the Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement?”

...The Syrian opposition Interim Government’s education minister condemned the test...

Idlib students asked to calculate execution odds