Šiaip mūsų supratimas apie Turkijos rolę šiame konflikte ir turkų visuomenės požiūrį yra toks romantiškas. Turkija žaidžia savo partiją ir ta partija labai specifinė: taip nenori Erdoganas rusų pergalės, bet nenori (ir gal net labiau) akivaizdžios ukrainiečių pergalės (tai jų supratimu yra JAV ir Europos pergalė). Mes pamirštame , kad 33 proc. turkų dėl karo kaltina Rusiją, bet net kiek daugiau nei 50 proc. kaltina ... JAV ir NATO. Turkams, kaip ir visiems to regiono gyventojams, dažnai yra būdinga meilė visokiems strongmenams ir putleris susilaukia simpatijų. Be to osmanizmo požiūris į rusišką imperializmą irgi toks specifinis: vena vertus aršūs konkurentai, bet linkę sudarinėti taktines sąjungas, nes osmanistų sąmonėje Vakarai yra didesnė grėsmė nei rusai. Beje šiandien lyg tyčia dieną gerą reportažą apie turkus rodė dabar jau iš Rygos veikianti rusiška Dožd televizija, tokia faina gruzinų kilmės žurnalistė Kotrikadzė. Ir čia vakare lyg tyčia dar ir sirgaliai.
More notable for Western policymakers, perhaps, should be the attitude of ordinary Turkish citizens, pro- and anti-Erdoğan alike, to the war: When asked in a survey by prominent Turkish pollster Metropoll whom they held responsible for the war, only 33.7 percent actually blamed Moscow. Nearly half of respondents, on the other hand, blamed the United States and NATO.
Why would so many more people polled in Turkey, a NATO member since 1952, blame the alliance and the United States for the war instead of the obvious aggressor, Russia?
Some analysts have pointed to a longstanding “Russophilia” in Turkey to explain the poll results. Many Turkish people are indeed enamored with Russia. Particularly for secular liberals with a penchant for European culture but resentment of Western arrogance, the Russian fine arts are not only admirable in their own right but also as a politically palatable alternative to their Western counterparts. This same attitude could apply to Russian foreign policy, prompting an image of Russia in Turkey not as an imperialist aggressor but as a plucky underdog. This is why even those Turkish people who in fact oppose Russian adventurism can nevertheless view it as an understandable response to encroaching U.S. influence in Russia’s—and Turkey’s—neighborhood, which they oppose equally, if not more.
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Of course, Erdoğan’s decades-long “West-bashing,” as other Turkey watchers have emphasized, has been a much stronger factor in shaping contemporary public opinion. Facing a steep economic crisis ahead of a cut-throat election next summer, Erdoğan now sees Turkey’s Western allies—and their riches—as a quick fix to his political conundrum.
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For most Turks, who hold deep-seated fears of Kurdish secession from Turkey, the U.S. military interventions in Iraq and Syria, which empowered Kurdish nationalism in both places, are examples of dangerous U.S. meddling in other countries, including in Turkey’s backyard. For the Kurds, conversely, Western support for successive Turkish governments that have denied basic rights to Kurdish citizens is proof of U.S. and NATO double standards on democracy and human rights. When Erdoğan’s media machine promotes anti-Western rhetoric and conspiracy theories, these underlying misgivings help those narratives find an audience well beyond the president’s ideological loyalists.
More notable for Western policymakers, perhaps, should be the attitude of ordinary Turkish citizens, pro- and anti-Erdoğan alike, to the war: When asked in a survey by prominent Turkish pollster Metropoll whom they held responsible for the war, only 33.7 percent actually blamed Moscow. Nearly half of respondents, on the other hand, blamed the United States and NATO.
Why would so many more people polled in Turkey, a NATO member since 1952, blame the alliance and the United States for the war instead of the obvious aggressor, Russia?
Some analysts have pointed to a longstanding “Russophilia” in Turkey to explain the poll results. Many Turkish people are indeed enamored with Russia. Particularly for secular liberals with a penchant for European culture but resentment of Western arrogance, the Russian fine arts are not only admirable in their own right but also as a politically palatable alternative to their Western counterparts. This same attitude could apply to Russian foreign policy, prompting an image of Russia in Turkey not as an imperialist aggressor but as a plucky underdog. This is why even those Turkish people who in fact oppose Russian adventurism can nevertheless view it as an understandable response to encroaching U.S. influence in Russia’s—and Turkey’s—neighborhood, which they oppose equally, if not more.
...
Of course, Erdoğan’s decades-long “West-bashing,” as other Turkey watchers have emphasized, has been a much stronger factor in shaping contemporary public opinion. Facing a steep economic crisis ahead of a cut-throat election next summer, Erdoğan now sees Turkey’s Western allies—and their riches—as a quick fix to his political conundrum.
...
For most Turks, who hold deep-seated fears of Kurdish secession from Turkey, the U.S. military interventions in Iraq and Syria, which empowered Kurdish nationalism in both places, are examples of dangerous U.S. meddling in other countries, including in Turkey’s backyard. For the Kurds, conversely, Western support for successive Turkish governments that have denied basic rights to Kurdish citizens is proof of U.S. and NATO double standards on democracy and human rights. When Erdoğan’s media machine promotes anti-Western rhetoric and conspiracy theories, these underlying misgivings help those narratives find an audience well beyond the president’s ideological loyalists.
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